Western policy in the horn

In the last days of his government, Mengistu Hailemariam sat in front of the Ethiopian parliament and explained why the capture by rebels of a hill four hours drive north of the capital city did not signal defeat for his regime. He reasoned that the reality of military engagement meant that hills are captured and lost all the time with little implication. Never mind that the rebels had one tenth the number of soldiers as the government, and that they were essentially equipped with captured government weapons. He continued to state that even the defeat at Afabet in Eritrea, which astute commentators of the time predicted would be Ethiopia’s Dien Bien Phu, really meant little since Afabet was a small town of 700 inhabitants. Never mind that it contained the largest Ethiopian garrison in Eritrea outside Asmara with the most elite of the Ethiopian fighting force, Nadew ez, within it.

Such egregious miscalculations by policy makers and leaders happen all too often. Typically they lead to the unnecessary extension of violence and suffering without having much altering impact on the final results.