Western policy in the horn

In the last days of his government, Mengistu Hailemariam sat in front of the Ethiopian parliament and explained why the capture by rebels of a hill four hours drive north of the capital city did not signal defeat for his regime. He reasoned that the reality of military engagement meant that hills are captured and lost all the time with little implication. Never mind that the rebels had one tenth the number of soldiers as the government, and that they were essentially equipped with captured government weapons. He continued to state that even the defeat at Afabet in Eritrea, which astute commentators of the time predicted would be Ethiopia’s Dien Bien Phu, really meant little since Afabet was a small town of 700 inhabitants. Never mind that it contained the largest Ethiopian garrison in Eritrea outside Asmara with the most elite of the Ethiopian fighting force, Nadew ez, within it.

Such egregious miscalculations by policy makers and leaders happen all too often. Typically they lead to the unnecessary extension of violence and suffering without having much altering impact on the final results. Today western policy in the horn is at such a juncture. The fallacious framework that informs policy and media publications needs to be challenged in order to reduce further suffering which is unlikely to alter the final outcomes in significant ways. However, in order to challenge such a framework one needs to investigate what primal interests drive the policies of the internal and external leaders. Intellectual frameworks exist to legitimize and further such interests after all.

Western military realignment

The post Cold War period has seen a significant realignment of western operations in Africa. Anglo-American interests have benefited the most while the influence of continental Europe, France in particular, has diminished dramatically. This transfer of influence has had much to do with major events in central and western Africa. These range from the pressures which led to the genocide in Rwanda to the collapse of states extending from Congo/Zaire through CAR, Chad to Cote d’Ivoire. In almost all cases regimes that are better aligned with French interest have either been removed or seriously weakened. This reality along with recent global realities of Anglo-American military setbacks in the Middle East and south Asia have created the right environment for a consolidation of western military and policy regimes.

Therefore in the past year alone France has accepted in principle to rejoin the NATO military command, from which De Gaulle had withdrawn in 1966, under terms which are worse than were presented then. Furthermore France will deploy military assets in south Asia in support of Anglo-American interests and in exchange has been given access to operate militarily in Africa and the Middle East. US policy makers have taken full advantage of their superior position and pushed France to help in securing the greater horn region. This resulted from the US view that success in this region has been illusive in combination with France’s eagerness to intervene in central Africa, Sudan and Somalia to protect its economic interests. African assertiveness and Chinese presence have only helped to intensify the reorganization. This realignment makes it safe to discuss western policy in a unified manner – at least when addressing security matters.

Conflict of interest

In a serious departure from the neo-colonial era, it is becoming evident that western interests in the horn are no longer fully aligned with those of the local leaders. This is a direct result of the internal pressures that local leaders are subjected to. It is no longer possible for local leaders to have overwhelming military advantage over their domestic and neighborly adversaries solely on account of western support. Furthermore, a growing urban population has made it necessary for local leaders to develop viable economic and political systems that can provide an illusion of economic opportunity and political inclusion. In rare cases, for the first time in the history of modern black Africa, illusions are no longer sufficient and leaders are being forced to provide actual economic opportunities and decision making power to large masses of mobilized groups – the equivalent of what Europe experienced at the beginning of the 20th century.

Political

In its simplest form, western political interest in the horn, and across the continent for that matter, is to achieve a significant degree of control over the state and regional organization infrastructure. Local leaders on the other hand are attempting to consolidate the state and regional organizations under their own terms so as to use them as vehicles of policy implementation. Even though these two aims can coincide in a few instances, they have increasingly been divergent, resulting in the weakening of both the states and regional organizations. Somalia’s state collapse, Ethiopia’s political instability and Sudan’s dissolution are clear examples of this. Moreover, the failure of all IGAD policies, as well as its own defunct state, indicate structural problems with the entire regional setup.

Economic

Western economic interests center on establishing secure access to African commodities, both as its consumers and producers. Moreover the west is focused on creating a viable African market for western products, most critically in the health and agricultural industries. Whereas the negative impacts of the commodity policy are widely discussed in media and academia, the devastating public health and food security impacts of the ‘market creation’ policy are rarely discussed openly. However, this latter area continues to gain popularity and access to western funding through programs run by such federal bodies as the CDC and USDA. Local leaders on the other hand are finding it hard to govern environments that are replete with extractive pollution and rebellion resulting from disenfranchised populations in commodity rich areas. The Ogaden and Gambella regions are good examples of this. Even more importantly for the horn, unhealthy and unfed populations are becoming increasingly impossible to mobilize for economic development or any other state initiative.

Security

The post cold war era saw Anglo-American policy in Africa adopt an ‘anchor policy’ for purposes of securing western interests. Policy framers deduced that quickly developing regional professional military capabilities in partnership with select states would result in an inexpensive security regime. Whereas the AU was to be used to legitimize most military interventions, the actual work of engagement was to be carried out by these quickly deployable African armies managed by western officers and funding scheme, typically in the form of private western military companies. This policy was to have the dual benefit of controlling the militaries of the anchor states since these were the largest in their respective regions. That this policy is not viable was made evident by the inability of the selected states, Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa to be effective in their assigned tasks. In the case of Ethiopia, its inability to force the submission of Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan to perceived western interests has forced the west to deploy its own military in the region.

Local leaders have found the ‘anchor policy’ unable to promote their interests. Anchor states have essentially lost control over their security policy and the states have been rendered totally insecure while their military establishment is distracted attempting to secure western interests. Ethiopia’s internal security collapse while it engages Eritrea and Somalia is starting to make headline news. In contradiction to domestic leadership, as well as western, interests Ethiopia is handing over large tracts of western fertile land to Sudan simply because it is forced to neutralize that state while it pursues western security policies elsewhere in the horn.

The ‘anchor policy’ has been resisted by the non anchor states for obvious reasons. Eritrea in particular has opposed the policy most ferociously because it recreates the cold war environment that denied it statehood for decades. Many observers have been stating that the collapse of international law in the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea with respect to their border will have far reaching consequences. The impact of western policy centered on non resolution of the border conflict is now impacting the border problems between Eritrea and D’Jibouti, essentially eliminating any peaceful mechanism for resolving it from the Eritrean perspective. Its adverse impact on Sudan’s planned separation will be even greater as the Abyei region’s disposition remains undecided.

Western support for years of Ethiopian policy in Somalia has denied consensus Somali governments such as the TNG from coming to power. While it seemed wise to allow Ethiopia to destroy the TNG a few years ago, in hindsight it now appears that its replacement the TFG has effectively been defeated by highly militant and undesirable – at least from a western point of view – Islamic forces who will continue to gain power. The consequences of this in Kenya are yet to become evident. Finally, the ‘anchor policy’ has benefited Sudanese defiance of western sanctions by stoking fratricide violence between Ethiopia and Eritrea, essentially denying the west of a counter balance to Sudan in the region. Southern Sudan, supported by the west, has yet to receive funds generated from Sudanese oil sales and its planned divorce from the north is unlikely to be peaceful.

Culture

One area of success in Anglo-American policy has been in the area of culture. Both consumerism and evangelical Christianity have taken hold in African urban settings. Taking advantage of this success has been difficult however due to the failure of the political, economic and security policies. Where success has been registered is in the affinity of Africans to western societies as destinations for migration. This has supplied western economies with a great deal of trained and untrained inexpensive labor. Furthermore, it has helped to diversify Anglo-American political circles with future potential for influence in Africa through returnee African Diaspora whose interest will be closely aligned with western interests. Continental Europe has been much less successful in this regard with the exception of similar French influence in West Africa.

Local leaders in the horn have had mixed reactions to this cultural inundation. While north Sudan and southern Somalia have reacted to them by attempting to completely insulate themselves in Islamic culture, Ethiopian leaders can be said to have had little reaction to it. Eritrean leaders appear to have embraced the culture but have attempted to limit its political and economic impact. As such they allow unhindered access to the culture by sponsoring fashion shows and internet cafes for instance, but persecute evangelical leaders who receive funding from western institutions.

The Saudis

Repeated western setbacks have forced Anglo-American policy makers to rely on loyal regional regimes to support their initiatives. The most important of these has been Saudi support for Ethiopian policies in the region. Anglo-American policy makers have always felt safe in Saudi inability to transfer anything threatening to the communities that they support – namely industrial or military know-how because they themselves have little capacity in this regard. The one exception to this is Wahhabism and it is yet to become clear in what way this will affect the horn. There is nothing new in Saudi support for Ethiopian regional postures. Both feared Arab nationalism at first and Eritrean independence later, and coordinated their policies accordingly in the cold war era. This time however, the Saudis have essentially taken control of almost all industrial production capacity in Ethiopia along with the gas and oil distribution sector. Their open support for Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia against an allegedly ‘Islamic’ movement is bound to create new alignments in the region. Iran, and to a lesser degree, Israel are likely to feel threatened by the inadvertent ‘Saudiazation’ of western policy in the horn.

Dead ends

US militarization of the horn over the past few years, and the significant increase in French involvement both in Sudan and Somalia in 2008, illustrate that western policy makers are shying away from the ‘anchor policy’. These events also illustrates that the military aspect of western policy in the horn overrides all other political, economic and cultural policy considerations. While distance from the ‘anchor policy’ can only help western interests, the fact that the west has reacted to policy failures by resorting to militarization is unfortunate. This direction is likely to increase resistance to western policy rather than decrease it. Short of annihilation using nuclear power – a policy that is not politically viable, the west is almost guaranteed to fail in military engagements in the region. Many of the local armed forces have gained a great deal of experience in rural modern asymmetric warfare over the past century that can be very costly for the west.

The shock that the region will experience from the ensuing confrontation will help to reduce even more dramatically the chances of success for western political and economic policies. All the past failure will continue to be repeated as long as western policy makers mischaracterize the resistance that they perceive in the region. Unlike East Asia which had partially industrialized on its own prior to the Second World War and felt the need to remove western competition, the horn has no such history. Local leaders are resisting western policy because it is denying them the most basic tools of governance.

Opportunities

The horn, similar to the rest of Sub Saharan Africa, would like to partner with the west in mutually beneficial economic ventures and is ready for material based economic development. In other words, most western economic objectives can be achieved without having to destroy every autonomous political organization in the region. For instance, Ethiopia can put in place functional public health policies without necessarily threatening western pharmaceutical interests. AIDS medication can still be produced within Ethiopia in partnership with western businesses in a way that does not threaten their interests. In fact this is important for the west because it prepares the horn to stand strong against external influences from the Middle East and East Asia which can come back to damage western interests in the future. The same holds true for strengthening relations western relations with the other states in the horn in an impartial manner.

Allowing the region to reorganize itself politically is also to the benefit of the west. The impact of collapsed and weak states has been devastating both for local leaders and western interests. The west can help to make the political organizations of the horn more than simple illusions of democracy by allowing the local leaders to respond to local pressures on their own without subsidies. For instance, it is not possible for Kenyan MPs who are paid as much as US Senators through western funding to be internally responsive. Such a change is likely to lead to states that are more functional, and these states will be less threatening to western interests than weak and collapsing states that are vulnerable to eastern influences – bound to be stronger than those of the west in the future.

Summary

With the accumulating failures, the intellectual framework that informs western academic writing and the media on the horn is becoming less relevant by the day. The framework will have to move away from its present paradigm and start assimilating the opportunities that exist. Simple characterization of the problems in the horn as a battle between good forces on one side and fundamentalist Muslims on the other is not tenable. It has already forced western media to characterize the dominantly culturally Christian leadership of Eritrea as Islamic, helping to greatly damage the credibility of western media and government outlets. Furthermore, it has led to embarrassing policy reversals, such as the one dealing with the Somali ICU and negotiating with them even though they are still Islamists. Similarly, characterizing the Darfur problems as racial – tending to insinuate religious friction – has complicated matters and been damaging to the efforts in that area. This intellectual framework, generally meant for western public consumption, has had a feedback effect in reducing the quality of policies that are generated by distorting the framework of the policy makers themselves.

A progressive framework will capture all the benefits of allowing the horn to develop its own functioning political entities and security regimes. The region will have to find its own way of entering the global economic order. This will inevitably result in internal economic opportunities as well as possibilities for partnership with the west, while at the same time reducing the pressures on local leaders. It is vital for western policy on the horn to be recalibrated in order for it to readjust to the realities. Otherwise it is likely to continue failing, and its makers and executors are bound to continue down a path of denial about these failures. More of the same wrong policy only results in unnecessary suffering for all parties involved without substantially altering the final outcome. It would make for an interesting metal exercise to imagine what would have come of the horn had Mengistu been able to foresee that losing a small hill so close to the capital city was signal enough to negotiate.